Introduction
With the term Hoare-Zike lugic we have in mind some proof system designed for the formal manipulation of assertions about the partial correctnesls of program texts witR respect to a tied interpretation A for the programming language. Stated simply, and informally, our aim in this paper is to exhibit some familiar algebraic structures A over which any sound Honre-like logic for the partial correctness of while-program computations in A will possess some unfamiliar structural properties. From this exercise follows somewhat stronger incompleteness results than those first reported in Cook [lo] and in Wand [25] for Hoare's original system about whileprograms. And, as we shall make clear in a moment, these results in turn address some sharply defined issues in the theoretical literature to do with the comple:tity of the programming language in the design of a Hoare logic.
Our point of departure is Hoare's proof system as it is formailly co&tutr!d for while-programs in [lo] . We take it for granted that the reader is familiar wizh the papers Hoare [l3] , Coo& [lo] and Wand [25] : with these prerequisites, or the invaluable survey paper Apt [lj, we can discuss ow examples in more technical terms.
Let A be any relational structure and let -TKp be ttie class of all w destined to compute functions on A. On choosing the first-order logical lang?~~:~ge L as assertion language, and applying a definition of thy semantics Y' of VV.9 to interpretation A, one may identify the study of partial correctness for %V computations over A as the study of a <set PC(A), the partial correctness theory for WCP on A.
030403975/82/0000-0000/$02.75_ @ 1982 North-Holland First, let us compare the theorem with the well understood intermediate situation of the standard model of arithmetic IV. By Cook's Co;npleteness Theorem, HL&V) is sound and complete, of course. The three components Th(N), HL&V) and PC(N) are highly non-constructive for they are not arithmetical sets, but they are of the same complexity, each having Turing degree O", see Rogers [23] . For the A of the theorem the situation is quite the reverse: no completeness possible and, whatever Hoare logic HL(A) is chosen, Th(A), HL(A) and PC(A) are arithmetical and effective, but in three disparate ways (up to Turing equivalence). In view of the fact that for any finite structure A, HL&I) = PC(A), it is presumably the case that Presburger Arithmetic is the canonical example of a structure for which no useful Hoare-like logic is available to reason about partial correctness for such a simple program language as V9? This is certainly supporaed by the theorem that there is indeed a nice Hoare logic, which is sound and complete, for certain loop-programs over Presburger Arithmetic: see Cherniavsky and Gamin [g] .
In this way one is Ied to reflect on the rGPe of the complexity of prograin languages in seeking sound and complete Hoare lagics. Although our examples are familiar (and simpler, at least in the case of Presbur ger Arithmetic), Wand's structure is by no Howe-litce logics 305 means redundant as it makes the point that the computational powe,r of a, program language is not necessarily a factor in its possession of a complete Hoare logic: on Wand's structure, the while-programs compute rather trivial functions whereas on ours they compute all recursive functions. On the other hand, there is a particularly striking incompleteness theorem in Clarke [9] which cays that for very rich program languages there can be no Hoare-like logic for the partial correctness of their computations on finite structures. Of course, for while-programs, augmented by many programming constructs, explicit Hoare logics which are complete for finite structures are known, see [9] and the survey paper [l] .
Our principal motive for preparing this paper was to complete a technical gictue of the incompleteness properties which trouble Hoare's logic, a picture Iargely outlined in the articles already cited. After a brief resume of backgr2und material, we give precise definitions for the concepts we use and develop their basic properties. Several of these primary definitions are natural generalisations of ideas implicitly used in papers such as Clarke [9] and Lipton [la] . in Section 3 we estalblish a general sufficient condition for the phenomena just described (Theorem 3.2? and this, too, echoes particular observations repeatedly made by earlier writers on the subject; we include a complete list of relevant references at the end of the sectio<n. In Section 4 we work out the applications of the machinery announced above.
This paper is a companion to our [7] which reconsiders the relationship between the expressiveness of the assertion language L for -%VP over a structure ,LI and the completeness of Hoare's logic HI&Q. Although, strictly speaking, exprcr:ss&~ness has no technical role in the present article, some discussion of the pt*operty is necessary in order to appreciate the extent to which Hoare's logic is cormpk te and we include notes on this subject in Section 5. Both the present paper and 1171 are !;equeIs to [5] , written with J. Tiuryn, which deals with technical issues in a theoretical analysis of the thesis that a programming language sema,ntics can be uniquely defined by a system of proof rules for its constructs; knowledge of [S] is not required, however.
We would like to thank K.R. Apt for his criticisms of an earlier edition of this paper.
l?reliminaries on structures, assertions and programs
In this preparatory section we shall map out the technical prerequisites for the paper. In addition to the three important sources Hoare [13] , Cook [lo] and Wand [25] , the reader would do well to consult the survey article [l] .
By an algebraic system, algebraic structure or, simply, an algebra we shall mean a relational structure A of recursively enumerable signature C with constants ci, operations cj and relations Rk.
The first-order language L of some signature 2 is based upon sets of variables 
T(C).
Using the syntax of L, the class ?V.. of all while-programs (with boolean variables) over Z is defined in the customary way.
Now for an3 algebra A of signature C, the semantics of the first-order language L over 2 determined by A has its standard definition in mDde1 theory and this we assume to be understood. The set of all assertions of L which are true in A is called the firsr-or&r theory 0% A and is denoted Th( A). For the semantics 9' of -%V over C determined by A we leave the reader d'ree to choose any sensible account of whife-program computations: [lo] ; the grat.ph-theoretic semantics in Greibach [ 121; the denotational semantics described in de Bakker [4] . What constraints must be placed on this choice are the necessities of formulating and proving certain lemmas, such as Lemmas 1 .l and 1.2 below, and of verifying soundness for the standard I-Ioare Logic (Theorem 2.1). These conditions will be evident from the text and, for such a simple programming formula as -3V9, can h ardly be problematical. For definiteness, we have in mind a nai've operational semantics based upon appropriate A-register machines which yield straightforward definitions of a state in a -WY computation and of the length of a 'KY computation [24] ; and a straightforward proof of this first fact: Putting together the semantics of L and -%Y determined by interpretation A we obtain the partial correctness theory PC(A) defined just as in the Introduction.
Qur definition of a computable algebraic structure derives from Rabin 1221 and Mal'cev [19] , independent papers delaoted to founding a general theory u:F computable algebras and their computable morphisms.
Let A be a structure of finite signature. Then A is computable if there exists a recursive subset $2 of the set of natural numbers u and a surjection CI : ;'I' --) A such that
(1) the relation =a defined on 0 by n za m e cyn = cym in A is recursive; and (2) for each k-ary operation c and each k-ary relation R of A there exis't: recursive functions & and l? which commute the following diagrams:
wherein Lyk(x1,. . . , .x.-k) = (axi,. . . , axk) and R is identified with its characteristiSc function.
We shall use a number of concepts and results from the theory of ?hlt: recursil/e functions: Turing and man y-one reducibilities ; completeness ; recursively H'nsepnrable sets ; the arithmetic hierarchy. With the exception of relativised Turing computabili~:y, particularly clear accounts of these subjects can be found in Mal'cev [2O] ,which Iye shall cite as we go along. The basic reference for recursion theory remains Rogers [23] however, and this should be consulted for any idea or fact not explained or referenced here.
Hoare logics
Let A be a structure. The standard Hoare logic for -Kg over A with assertion language L has the usual axioms and proof rules for manipulating asserted whileprograms and these can be found in [l, 4,10,13] . Worthy of an explicit ci;t.ation is the rule of inference known as the Consequence Rule, and, in connection with it, the oracle of axioms: Each member of Th(A) ill an asiit3rn* The set of all triples of the form { p}S{q}, or asserted programs, derivable from these axioms by the proof rules we denote HILo( we write HLo(A) I---(p}S(q i' in place of {pIs(qI E HLo(A).
Theorem. For any algebraic structure A, HLo(A) is sound in the sense that

HLo(A) c PC(A) and is recursively enumerable in Tlr(A).
Thje firsi statement is contained in Section 5 of [lo] . 
The halting problem and decidable theories
Let {P, : e E o} be a recursive enumeration of ?V'P over the signature of algebra A. In the case A = N, the standard model of arithmetic, the halting problem for *w$P over N can be defined as K ={(e, n): P,(n)J}co
X0.
And it is, well known that K is an r.e., non-recursive set (because whila!-programs compute the recursive functions on N). Indeed, K is a complete r,e. se<!, mefIning: every r.e. subset of o is many-one reducible to K. (Remember that X C-o is mangy-one reducible to Y c w if there exists a recursive function f: w + w sucir thilt n E X ~2f(n) E Y; in symbols X Go Y.) We want to define a number-theon:tic halting problem for %4P on any A and we shall do this by syntactically modelling ':he catural algebraic halting problem {(e, a): P,(a)&} E o x A restricted to the mininsal Csubalgebra MINX(A) of A. The algebra MINX(A) is, by definition, the Z'-+;ubaigebra of A generated from the constants of A by its operations. Its connection with ri:!yntax is that it is the image of the valuation map v : T(2) + A which is defined Pty ay@gning to each operation symbol and constant symboi in t the function and element the) name in A and then evaluating. Thus T(C) is a recursive set of names f'sjr tht: elements of MINE (A).
By a state formula we mean a formula in L of the form /'&=I xi = ti wkxs: Xi is a 
Lemma. The set lK(A) is many-one reducible to PC(A). In pakx/ar, if K(N) snzK (A) then PC(A) is not recursive.
Proof, This is immediate because (e, i) & K(A) if, and only if, either the velriables of Pe and c;bi fail to match or {&}Pe{f&e} E PC(A).
We generate our examples from this technical fact.
Theorem. Suppose Th(A) to be decidable and that K(N) r's many-on? reducible to K (A). Let I-IL(A) be any sound Hoare logic for -WY on A extending t f E standard Hoare logic HLo(A); that is HLo(A) c HE(A) c K(A). Then
(1) HL(A) is r.e. but not recursive ; (2) W(A) is co-r.e. but not recursive ; indeed, PC(A) is a complete co-r. e. set. In particular, A has no sound and complete Hoare logic for its lwhile-prog.r*ams.
Proof,, The absence of completeness for Hoare logics is an application of Corollary 2.4 to statement (2). Statement (2) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 3.1 e Thus the concern for completeness can be settled quite easily. More dificult is the proof that A has no sound, but incomplete, recursive Hoare logic. Consider statement ( 1) Let U and V be t*vo disjoint r.e. subsets of w which are recursively inseparable. This means there does not exist a recursive set 1Z such that U c R and V c 1R (to see why such se::) a';xist consult [20, p. 2ZO] ).
Since K(N) s ,K(A), and K(N) is many-one complete for all r.e. sets, we can choose recursive fxgnctions U, v, f, g L o + w such that wherein x = (XI,. . . , xJ, y = (~1,. , . , ys> and these depend on n.
Without loss of generality we can assume these expressions between formulae and programs to have the following normal forms: Proof. This is done by induction on the complexity of S. The basis ancr most cases of the induction step are easy and are omitted. We consider only the cab;;e S = while b do SO od.
So suppose for such S that A l=4(x)+ S(x)i and /4 t={4jS{$}; and assume Lemma 3.4 is true of So. Let the computation which 4 determines r'rom S on MINr(A]~ involve I executions of So. And let 4', . . . , 4' be state formulae defining the initial states at each of these executions together with the final state. Thus, these formulae are defined inductively by 4'=4 and 4' = that formula, unique up to A-equivalence, such that A I= {4i}S,{4i+').
Setting 6 = vf=, 4' we see clearly from its construction that
At=4(x)+B(x)
and Al=@(x)Alb(x)+$(x) and that we have now to prove HLo(A) +{0 A b}&(6). and to string these proofs together it is enough to apply the following derived proof rule of HLo(A); for any ~1, p2,91,92~ L and any SE WY { pr)s{911, (@(92) __--
To verify this is indeed a derived rule of HLo(A) is an eas:lr induction on proof lengths. Once one has framed the concepts of the formal halting problem K(A) and of a Hoare-Me logic, one can obtain the last statement of Theorem 3.2 from this general remark, but not the theorem's main slratements (1) and (2), of course. The origin of Apt's obserbjation is the argument of Theorem 2 in [lo] which shows that HLo(A) is incompiete in case A is Presburger Arithmetic; and we again find it in use in [9] , there applied to finite structures A which interpret much richer programming languages than WV with undecidable halting problems for IAl 2 2. Actually, the termination of programs over finite interpretations was considered, independently of Hoare's logic, in Langmaack [14, 15] ; for example the observation applies there to sharpen one of Clarke's incompleteness results to include structures A with IA I= 1, and it a;speai ;. often in Langmaack and Olderog's extensive studies of Hoare-like logics for the higher progralm languages, see [16f and the references there cited.
However, Theorem 3.2 should n:Jt be confused with any interesting fact about the incompleteness of Hoare-like logics addressing the issue of totaZ correctness. As :t happens HL(A) is not even sound for asserted programs with their total correctGe!:s semantics; and indeed L is unable to support any logic for total correctness as mziy easily be surmiced from remarks in Section 2.6 of [l] . 
Examples
The basic reference for information about decidable first-order theories is Err.hot et al, [ll] . Here we choose to mention a few structures with decidable theories which lead to easily appreciated examples for incompleteness:
(1) Yresburger's &4rithmetic having domain o, constant 0 E o and operation the successor function on W;
(2) any algebraically closed field such as the comple:K numbers or algebraic numbers;
(3) any real closed field such as the real numbers or real algebraic numbers. In each case it is easy to verify the halting problem hypothesis in Theorem 3.2 providing, of course, one chooses fields of characteristic zero: the standard halting problem K is recursively isomorphic to K(A) when A is Paesburger Arithmetic and since this structure can be embedded in the field of rational numbers Q, which is the prime subfield of any field F of characteristic: zero, the reduction
follows. For a finer comparison with the standard situation A = N we prefer to choosle computable structures (and also we have in mind the role Llf computable interpretations in [ 171). Presburger Arithmetic is clearly computablti. To obtain cornput-, able fields of kinds (2) and (3) one applies the following theorems from Rabin [22] and Madison [18] respectively. Let F be a computable field. Then the algebraic closure of F is computable, If, in a.dditiow, F has a computable ordering then the real closure of F is computable.
Concluding remarks on expressiveness and completeness
Cook's discussion of the completeness of Hoare's logic begins with the fact that HLo(A) is incomplete when A is Presburger Arithmetic and continues with the observation that a particular source o-C difficuity in attempting to assess the completeness of Hoare's system is that the assertion language on which it is based may not be able to define all the invariants for loops. Thus, Cook defines a not necessarily first-order assertion language AL to be expressive for "?VY over structure A if for each assertion & E AL and program S E -Wg the strongest postcondition sp,&, S) is definable in AL. In our situaticen AL, is fixed as the first-order language L so expressiveness is a property of interpresations; for example, the standard model of arithmetic is expressive, blut Presburger Arithkmetic is not. Cook showed that if AL is expressive for -WY over A then I-ILo(A) Ss compk8e and one now says that Moare's logic is complete in the ser:!re of Cook because whenever the ass'ertion language is not troubled by its own interaal inadequacies then the system is indeed complete. Does this perceptive theoreticas analysis resbn t v -Z-r@ the incompleteness phenomena noticed for Presburger Arithmetic and extensively analysed in l;his paper? We believe it does not.
The problems begin with the paucity of structures which turn out to be expressive and with the existence of natural structures for whic*h nothing resembling a complete Hoare logic can be made even for whil'e-programs. A theorem about the expressive structures by de Mills, Lipton Thus such structurt:s either contain arithmetic in a first-order definable wgy and so are subject to the logical pathologies characteristic of arithmetic or else they are essentially uniformly locally finite structures on which one can compute l'ery little <see [24) ).
Secondly, come problems with the r&e of expressiveness in completeness arguments. Finite structures are expressive and so Clarke's work shows that when the programming languages grow more complicated then expressiveness can no longer guarantee the existence of a complete Hoare logic. On the other hand, expressiveness is not even a necesszlry condition for completeness: in r1] we point out structures A where Hb(A) is complete, but L is not expressive for WP over A. (However we have not yet found computable structures for which this is the case.)
Thirdly, it should be remembered that the quest for completeness for Hoare-like !ogics H'L(A), using the first-order theory of the interpretation A as oracle, ignores the original idea that the systems should be based upon an axiomatic specification of the data types on which the programs compute (see [13] ). It seems to us that this connection between data type specifications and form;?lised correctness concerns is one which is worth recovering even at the expense of the fine completeness theorems Cook was able to provide; an experiment of this kind, relying solely on algebraic specifications for data types, is [h] and its completeness theorem should be compared with Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.1 in [2]. ,;\ bold a'rtempt to think through the depressing theoretical problems which beset total correctness has been made by Back in [3] .
